

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 897

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JA
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA VISIT TO MOSCOW

REF: TOKYO 771; MOSCOW 828

1. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MIYAZAWA ON JANUARY 21 AT HIS INVITATION TO RECEIVE A BRIEFING ON HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW JANUARY 15-17. MIYAZAWA REMARKED AT OUTSET THAT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR MOSCOW, HE HAD HOPED THERE MIGHT BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO MEET WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER IN EUROPE IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS MOSCOW VISIT AND WAS SORRY THIS HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE. HE WISHED, HOWEVER, TO GIVE ME A RUNDOWN ON HIS DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW TO BE PASSED ON TO THE SECRETARY.

2. DURING HIS STAY IN MOSCOW, MIYAZAWA MET ON FOUR OCCASIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO FOR A TOTAL OF EIGHT HOURS AND ALSO MET FOR ONE HOUR WITH PRESIDENT PODGORNYY. (ON THE LATTER OCCASION, MIYAZAWA TRANSMITTED A LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER MIKI TO BREZHNEV.) DURING MEETING WITH PODGORNYY, MIYAZAWA RENEWED INVITATION TO BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY AND GROMYKO TO VISIT JAPAN. PODGORNYY SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THEY COULD NOT COME AT SAME TIME, THEY ARE ALL INDIVIDUALLY INTERESTED IN VISITING JAPAN. MIKI HAD THE

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IMPRESSION THAT PODGORNYY AT LEAST IS GENUINELY INTERESTED

IN DOING SO.

3. DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO COVERED BILATERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING PROSPECTS FOR A JAPAN-SOVIET PEACE TREATY, AS WELL AS CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. MIYAZAWA REMARKED THAT GROMYKO'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO A PEACE TREATY WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE TIME OF TANAKA'S VISIT IN OCTOBER 1973 IN THAT GROMYKO DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ASSERT THAT THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE IS ALREADY SETTLED, RATHER, GROMYKO CALLED ON JAPAN TO TAKE A "REALISTIC" ATTITUDE, WHICH MIYAZAWA UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO SOVIET CONCERN TO AVOID ANY PRECEDENT PREJUDICIAL TO ITS POSITION ON EASTERN EUROPEAN AND SINO-SOVIET BORDER ISSUES. APPARENTLY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY, GROMYKO SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF TREATY OF "PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP" ALONG LINES OF PROSPECTIVE JAPAN-PRC NEGOTIATIONS. MIYAZAWA COUNTERED THAT UNLESS FOUR NORTHERN ISLANDS ARE RETURNED, THERE COULD NOT BE A STATE OF PEACE OR FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND USSR. MIYAZAWA REMINDED GROMYKO THAT THEY HAD FIRST MET AT SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY CONFERENCE IN 1951. HE THEREFORE REMARKED TO GROMYKO THAT ONE-QUARTER OF CENTURY HAD PASSED AND JAPAN AND SOVIET UNION STILL DISCUSSING NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE; ANOTHER 25 YEARS WOULD BRING BOTH COUNTRIES INTO 21ST CENTURY. HE EMPHASIZED TO GROMYKO THAT BOTH COUNTRIES COULD ACCOMPLISH A GREAT DEAL IN COOPERATION IF GENUINE FRIENDSHIP EXISTED. THEREFORE, HE FELT, "REALISTIC APPROACH" WOULD BE TO REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONS PERMITTING CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOVIET UNION. MIYAZAWA STRESSED TO GROMYKO THAT TERRITORIAL ISSUE IS THE RPT THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO SUCH DEVELOPMENT. MIYAZAWA STATED THAT HE AND GROMYKO DID AGREE TO MAKE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT TO "PENDING ISSUES". (THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT AS IT APPEARED IN THE JAPANESE PRESS READS: "AT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY, BOTH SIDES DISCUSSED VARIOUS PROBLEMS BASED ON AN AGREEMENT SET FOR IN THE CONCERNED PARTS OF THE JAPAN-USSR COMMUNIQUE DATED OCTOBER 10, 1973.") GROMYKO REFUSED TO PERMIT A REFERENCE TO "TERRITORIAL ISSUES" BUT MIYAZAWA MADE EXPLICIT TO HIM HIS VIEW THAT "PENDING ISSUES" REFER ONLY TO TERRITORIAL

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ISSUE. DURING DISCUSSION OF POSSIBILITIES FOR TREATY OF PEACE AND FREINDSHIP, GROMYKO MADE REFERENCE TO CERTAIN "PRINCIPLES" THAT SHOULD PREVAIL IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT, ONE OF WHICH WAS THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD NOT "LEND" PART OF THEIR TERRITORIES TO FOREIGN FORCES. MIYAZAWA COUNTERED ON THIS POINT BY ASKING GROMYKO WHETHER HE HAD CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT WITHOUT A U.S.-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, A GENERATION HENCE JAPAN MIGHT ELECT TO ACQUIRE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MIYAZAWA DID NOT STATE WHAT GROMYKO'S RESPONSE WAS TO THIS THRUST.

4. MIYAZAWA STATED THAT GROMYKO ALSO HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO INCLUDE IN JOINT STATEMENT EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO HIS AGREEMENT TO VISIT JAPAN IN 1975. MIYAZAWA RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD INSISTED THAT UNLESS SUCH REFERENCE WERE MADE, THERE WAS NO POINT IN ISSUING JOINT STATEMENT, AND HE WAS PREPARED TO LEAVE IT AT THAT. HE STATED WITH EVIDENT SATISFACTION THAT JUST BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW, GROMYKO CALLED ON HIM AT GUEST HOUSE TO SAY THAT HE HAD OBTAINED AGREEMENT WITHIN SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE SUCH REFERENCE. IT WAS MIYAZAWA'S IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO'S INITIAL RELUCTANCE WAS NOT SIMPLY MATTER OF TACTICS, BUT RESULT OF OPPOSITION ELSEWHERE WITHIN SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHICH GROMYKO FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN OVERCOMING. ON WAY TO AIRPORT, MIYAZAWA REMARKED TO GROMYKO THAT IT WAS FORTUNATE HE WAS TRAVELLING ON REGULARLY SCHEDULED JAL FLIGHT RATHER THAN HIS OWN PLANE. OTHERWISE, THIS ISSUE MIGHT HAVE CONSUMED SOME SIX OR SEVEN HOURS OF FURTHER NEGOTIATION. MIYAZAWA ALSO REMARKED THAT ALTHOUGH HE AND GROMYKO INITIALLY HAD AGREED TO ISSUE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE "SOMEBODY ON SOVIET SIDE" OBJECTED TO THIS AND THEY FINALLY AGREED TO USE TERM JOINT STATEMENT. MIYAZAWA FELT THAT PROBABLY BECAUSE OF SOVIET DESIRE NOT TO BE UPSTAGED BY PRC CONTACTS WITH GOJ, SOVIETS WERE PARTICULARLY DESIROUS TO HAVE SOME SORT OF FORMAL STATEMENT ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT AND THAT THIS GAVE HIM SOME LEVERAGE IN REACHING FINAL AGREEMENT WITH GROMYKO.

5. IN DISCUSSION OF JAPAN-SOVIET TRADE, MIYAZAWA TOOK INITIATIVE ON TWO OCCASIONS TO RAISE SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT IN LIGHT OF RECENT SOVIET SUSPENSION OF 1972 TRADE AGREEMENT WITH U.S. ON FIRST OCCASION, HE NOTED THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT

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MENT LIKELY TO MAKE IMPOSSIBLE EL PASO PARTICIPATION IN

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EXDIS

YAKUTSK NATURAL GAS PROJECT SINCE EL PASO HAD BEEN COUNTING ON EX-IM BANK LOAN, AND MIYAZAWA INDICATED THAT THIS MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT JAPANESE PARTICIPATION. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT THIS QUESTION WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN "THE GROUP" (PRESUMABLY SYNDICATE-HEADED BY EL PASO) AND USG. ON SECOND OCCASION, MIYAZAWA SOUGHT TO PROBE SIGNIFICANCE SOVIETS ATTACH TO THEIR SUSPENSION OF TRADE AGREEMENT. IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS FEEL PROBLEM IS MORE MATTER BETWEEN U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESS THAN BETWEEN SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND USG. GROMYKO GAVE IMPRESSION, SAID MIYAZAWA, THAT GROMYKO "CONSIDERED SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER IN SAME BOAT AND U.S. CONGRESS IN ANOTHER". IT WAS MIYAZAWA'S IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO SEEMED TO EXPECT THAT SOONER OR LATER SOME NEW ARRANGEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT EITHER BETWEEN USG AND USSR OR BETWEEN EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESS WHICH WOULD MAKE EX-IM BANK FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, MIYAZAWA STATED THAT GROMYKO WAS CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE ANY IMPRESSION THAT SIVIETS CONSIDERED THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD AFFECT POLICY OF DETENTE. MIYAZAWA OBSERVED THAT GROMYKO'S DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT WAS CALM THROUGHOUT; "HE DID NOT RAISE HIS VOICE".

6. OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES DISCUSSED BETWEEN GROMYKO AND MIYAZAWA INCLUDED FISHERIES PROBLEM, ECONOMIC COOPERATION, REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE CITIZENS AND VISITS FO JAPANESE GRAVES IN SIBERIA. MIYAZAWA STATED THAT MOST SPECIFIC

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RESPONSE HE RECEIVED TO JAPANESE POSITIONS ON THESE MATTERS CAME DURING MEETING WITH PODGORNY, WHO INFORMED HIM OF DECISION TO RELEASE 15 JAPANESE FISHERMEN. MIYAZAWA CONSIDERED THIS "MORE OR LESS ROUTINE GESTURE".

7. WITH RESPECT TO DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION, MIYAZAWA STATED THAT GROMYKO HAD EXPRESSED VIEW THAT GENEVA CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED SOON. GROMYKO OBSERVED, HOW-

EVER, THAT ARAB WORLD IS VERY COMPLEX AND THERE ARE AS MANY OPINIONS AS COUNTRIES, AND HE WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF SAUDIS. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO MADE SOME REFERENCE TO U.S. "STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH TO RESOLUTION OF MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM, MIYAZAWA WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO ITS IMPORT. FIRST EAST EUROPEAN DIVISION DIRECTOR ARAI, WHO WAS PRESENT AT MEETING AND UNDERSTAND RUSSIAN, SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD EMPHASIZED NEED FOR TOTAL AND MANY-SIDED APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. IT WAS ARAI'S IMPRESSION THAT ALTHOUGH GROMYKO EXPRESSED UNCERTAINTY WHETHER U.S. "STEP-BY-STEP" APPROACH WOULD SERVE THIS PURPOSE, HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THAT POSSIBILITY. MIYAZAWA COMMENTED THAT GROMYKO "WAS NOT VERY LOQUACIOUS" IN DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST AND MADE NO REFERENCE TO ANY ACTIVE SOVIET ROLE IN REACHING SOLUTION.

8. ALTHOUGH BOTH QUESTION OF CHINA AND NPT WERE RAISED BY GROMYKO, MIYAZAWA SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT TIME FOR EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS. MIYAZAWA SUMMARIZED GROMYKO'S REMARKS ON SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS TO EFFECT THAT GROMYKO HAD EMPHASIZED THOSE RELATIONS AS "BAD" DESPITE SOVIET EFFORTS TO IMPROVE. ON NPT, MIYAZAWA TOLD GROMYKO THAT ONCE CERTAIN TECHNICAL PROBLEMS (E.G., SAFEGUARDS AND PEACEFUL USES) WERE RESOLVED, GOJ INTENDED TO PRESENT TREATY TO DIET FOR RATIFICATION.

9. I ASKED MIYAZAWA WHETHER HE HAD OBTAINED ANY INSIGHT INTO BREZHNEV'S HEALTH AND STATUS. HE REPLIED THAT GROMYKO EVIDENTLY DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WHEN OTHERS WERE PRESENT. AT ONE POINT, HOWEVER, GROMYKO HAD TAKEN HIM ASIDE AND TOLD HIM IN ENGLISH THAT KRT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO MEET BREZHNEV AT THAT TIME ALTHOUGH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TWO WEEKS LATER. MIYAZAWA STATED THAT HE HAD ASKED GROMYKO WHY THIS WAS THE CASE, BUT GROMYKO EVIDENTLY WAS NOT PREPARED

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TO BE RESPONSIVE AND REPLIED "RATHER LAMELY" THAT BREZHNEV NOT IN TOWN.

10. SUMMING UP, MIYAZAWA COMMENTED IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION THAT BASICALLY HIS MISSION HAD BEEN TO CONFIRM AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN TANAKA AND BREZHNEV THAT IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE TREATY THERE ARE PENDING ISSUES (I.E., THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE) WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED. HE FELT THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN RECONFIRMED BY HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO AND THAT IN THIS SENSE, SOVIET POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS "SLIGHT STEP FORWARD" SINCE SOVIETS DID NOT REFUSE TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE WHEN GROMYKO VISITS JAPAN IN 1975.

11. COMMENT: MIYAZAWA WAS QUITE RELAXED IN DISCUSSING

RESULTS OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT AND EVIDENTLY FELT THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED AS MUCH AS COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED. HE OBVIOUSLY ENJOYED RECOUNTING HIS SPARRING WITH GROMYKO ON VARIOUS POINTS AND SEEMED TO FEEL SATISFIED THAT HE HAD HELD HIS OWN. AT NO POINT DID MIYAZAWA INDICATED THAT MIKI GOVERNMENT OR HE HIMSELF FEELS ANY SENSE OF URGENCY IN RESOLVING PENDING ISSUES WITH SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING NORTHERN TERRITORIES. EVEN ON QUESTION OF FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT, MIYAZAWA GAVE NO SIGN OF CONCERN. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY SO, I GAINED IMPRESSION THAT HE DOES NOT EXPECT MUCH PROGRESS TO BE MADE ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE EVEN IF GROMYKO DOES, IN FACT, VISIT JAPAN DURING 1975, BUT HE EVIDENTLY IS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ON THIS POINT. I SUSPECT THAT LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, MIKI GOVERNMENT TENDS TO GIVE HIGHER PRIORITY TO EXPANDING PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC AND IS CONTENT TO CARRY ON BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH SOVIETS.

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